False Discoveries: Winners and Losers in Mutual Fund Performance by Cuthbertson, K. et al.
Cuthbertson, K., Nitzsche, D. & O'Sullivan, N. (2008). False Discoveries: Winners and Losers in 
Mutual Fund Performance. London: SSRN. 
City Research Online
Original citation: Cuthbertson, K., Nitzsche, D. & O'Sullivan, N. (2008). False Discoveries: 
Winners and Losers in Mutual Fund Performance. London: SSRN. 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/16849/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093624
 
FALSE DISCOVERIES: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN 
MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE  
 
  
 
Keith Cuthbertson*, Dirk Nitzsche* and Niall O’Sullivan** 
 
 
 
This version :  5th January 2008 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
We use a multiple hypothesis testing framework to estimate the false discovery rate (FDR) amongst 
UK equity mutual funds.  For all funds, we find a relatively high FDR for the best funds of 67% (at a 10% 
significance level), which indicates that only around 2% of all funds truly outperform their benchmarks.  For 
the worst funds the FDR (at a 10% significance level), is relatively small at 15.9% which results in 20% of 
funds which truly underperform their benchmarks.  For different investment styles, this pattern of very few 
genuine winner funds is repeated for all companies, small companies and equity income funds.  However, 
forming portfolios of funds based on a set of funds for which the FDR is relatively low, produces positive 
alphas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keyword : Mutual fund performance, false discovery rate.  
JEL Classification : C15, G11, C14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*   Cass Business School, City University, London, UK 
** Department of Economics, University College Cork, Ireland 
 
Corresponding Author: 
Professor Keith Cuthbertson, Cass Business School, 106 Bunhill Row, London, EC1Y  8TZ. 
Tel. : +44-(0)-20-7040-5070,  
Fax : +44-(0)-20-7040-8881,  
E-mail : K.Cuthbertson@city.ac.uk 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093624
 
FALSE DISCOVERIES: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN 
MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE  
 
1. Introduction 
In the US and UK about 70% of institutional funds are actively managed and this rises to 
over 90% for retail funds.  Tests of the performance of active mutual funds are important for 
investors choosing between active and index funds and for the broader question of the validity of 
the EMH, given that the mutual fund industry appears to be highly competitive with low barriers to 
entry and plentiful information available at relatively low cost.  It is well documented that the 
average US or UK equity mutual fund underperforms its benchmarks (Elton, Gruber, Das and 
Hlavka 1993, Wermers 2000, Quigley and Sinquefield 2000, Fletcher 1997).  However, the cross-
section standard deviation of the alphas for individual funds in both the UK and US is high, 
indicating the possibility that some funds are performing very well and others very badly (Malkiel 
1995, Kosowski et al 2006, Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O’Sullivan 2008).  In the US and UK the 
latter results are not overturned by the addition of market timing variables or the use of 
conditional alpha-beta models, as these “additional variables” when added to unconditional factor 
models appear to be statistically insignificant (Treynor and Mazuy 1966, Henriksson and Merton 
1981, Ferson and Schadt 1996, Fletcher 1995, Leger 1997).   
 
In this paper we examine the performance of individual funds and address the question of 
how many actively managed UK funds we truly expect to have an (ex-post) abnormal net return 
performance (after adjustments for risk) which is positive, negative or zero.   
 
The standard approach to determining whether the performance of a single fund (or a 
single portfolio such as the average fund) demonstrates skill or luck is to choose a rejection 
region and associated significance level γ  and to reject the null of “no outperformance” if the test 
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 statistic lies in the rejection region - ‘luck’ is interpreted as the significance level chosen.  
However, using γ = 5% when testing the alphas for each of m-funds, the probability of finding at 
least one lucky fund from a sample of m-funds is much higher than 5% (even if all funds have true 
alphas of zero)1.  Put another way, if we find 20 out of 200 funds (i.e. 10% of funds) with 
significant positive estimated alphas when using a 5% significance level then some of these will 
merely be lucky – indeed 5% of all true null-funds found to be significant, will be false positives.  
(The false positive rate is the probability that the fund’s performance is found to be significant, 
given that it is truly null).  One method of dealing with the possibility of false discoveries is to test 
each of the m-funds independently but use a very conservative estimate for the significance level 
of each test - for example the Bonferroni test  would use / mγ  =  0.000125.  This would ensure 
that the overall error rate in testing m-funds (known as the Family Wise Error Rate) is controlled 
at γ  - but the danger here is in excluding funds that may truly outperform2.   
  
In testing the performance of many funds a balanced approach is needed - one which is 
not too conservative but allows a reasonable chance of identifying those funds with truly 
differential performance.  An approach known as the false discovery rate (FDR) attempts to strike 
this balance by classifying funds as “significant” (at a chosen significance level γ ) and then asks 
the  question, “What proportion of these significant funds are false discoveries?” – that is, are 
truly null (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995, Storey 2002 and Storey, Taylor and Siegmund 2004).  
The FDR measures the proportion of lucky funds among a group of funds which have been found 
to have significant (individual) alphas and hence ‘measures’ luck among the pool of ‘significant 
funds’.  For example, suppose the FDR amongst 20 significant best/winner funds (e.g. those with 
positive alphas) is 80% then this implies that only 4 funds (out of the 20) have truly significant 
                                                 
1
   This probability is the compound type-I error.  For example, if the m tests are independent then Pr(at least 1 
false discovery) = 1 – (1- γ )m  = zm , which for a relatively small number of  m=50 funds and conventional γ =0.05 gives 
zm = 0.92 – a high probability of observing at least one false discovery. 
 
2
  Holm (1979) uses a step down method which uses significance level / mγ  for the lowest p-value fund and 
higher significance levels for subsequent ordered p-values, but this also produces conservative inference. 
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 alphas3 - this is clearly useful information for investors.  So, truly informed investors when forming 
portfolios need to know both the size of the significant alphas of individual funds and also the 
FDR amongst these alphas.   
 
The competitive model of Berk and Green (2004) suggests that entry and exit of funds 
should ensure that in equilibrium there are neither funds with long-run positive nor negative 
abnormal performance. The US mutual fund industry has been extensively analyzed and 
although the UK fund market is smaller, our sample of around 650 UK equity funds provides a 
large comprehensive independent data set, thus mitigating possible claims of data snooping bias 
if results are only based on repeated analysis of US data4.    
 
In this paper we estimate the FDR for all UK mutual funds, for different style categories 
and we also estimate the FDR separately for funds with positive and negative alphas.  The 
change in the FDR as the level of significance changes also allows us to determine whether the 
truly best and worse performing funds are concentrated or dispersed in the tails of the 
distribution.   
 
The FDR has been used to analyze US equity mutual funds (Barras, Scaillet and 
Wermers 2005) while here we use UK data and extend the analysis to consider the performance 
of portfolios of mutual funds formed on the basis of the FDR statistic.  For example, as the  
significance level is increased, we will obtain more “significant funds” but if this is accompanied by 
an increase in the FDR, many of these significant funds may be merely lucky – in forming 
                                                 
3
  We use the usual language and terminology found in the statistical literature on false discoveries and error 
rates.  The use of the word “truly” (sometimes “genuine” is used) should not be taken to mean that we are 100% certain 
that a proportion of funds among a  particular group of significant funds have non-zero alphas – the FDR even if it is found 
to be zero, is still subject to estimation error.  Also note that the FDR says nothing about the statistical significance of the 
alpha of any particular individual fund - conceptually, the FDR only applies to a group of significant funds. The FDR 
approach seems to have been first used in testing the difference between genes in particular cancer cells Storey (2002) 
and has recently been used in the economics literature to test alternative exchange rate models McCracken and Sapp 
(2005) and to test the performance of US equity mutual funds (Barras, Scaillet and Wermers 2005). 
4
   In other developed countries the mutual fund sector  is generally less mature and smaller than in the US and UK   
– indeed many countries have little reliable mutual fund returns data and auxiliary variables to capture risk factors or 
performance attribution are less readily available. Hence the US has to-date provided most evidence on mutual fund 
performance.   
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 portfolios of funds it may therefore be prudent to include a small number of significant funds 
which have a low FDR rather than form a larger portfolio of significant funds but having a higher 
FDR.  We therefore estimate the number of best and worst performing funds while controlling the 
overall FDR.  This allows us to identify a subset of funds for which the FDR is less than some 
chosen value, say 10% and provides the investor with a subset of significant funds to include in a 
fund-of-funds portfolio, for which she has set the FDR at an acceptable level.  We then estimate 
the expected alpha for this portfolio. 
 
In summary, this paper adds to the UK mutual fund literature by analyzing the robustness 
of the FDR approach and how it may give different inferences from the standard approach of 
“counting” the number of significant funds.  We also apply the FDR approach to portfolio 
formation and determine the expected alpha from a set of funds which have a maximum FDR set 
at a predetermined level.  Our key results are that there is a much higher proportion of false 
discoveries among the best funds than among the worst funds – so the standard method of 
simply counting the number of funds with “significant” test statistics can be far more misleading 
for “winners” than for “losers”.  We find few funds which truly outperform their benchmarks and 
these are concentrated in the extreme right tail of the performance distribution, whereas there are 
a far greater number of genuinely poor performing funds, which are spread throughout the left tail.  
This result holds for different investment styles, so there are few winners in any of our style 
categories but there are far fewer equity income funds that are truly poor performers, relative to 
the number of poor performers in either the All Companies or Small Company sectors.  If we 
control the overall FDR at say 10% then from our set of significant funds, there are a maximum of 
20 truly winner funds (3% of all funds) and about 4 times more loser funds (13% of all funds) - but 
the majority of funds neither statistically beat nor are inferior to their benchmarks and therefore 
appear to do no better on a risk adjusted performance then merely tracking their style indexes5. 
                                                 
5
  Using US data Kosowski et al (2006) measure the role of luck in mutual fund performance using p-values of the 
ordered individual funds – however, a simple count of funds with ‘significant’ p-values ignores the possibility of some 
significant funds being “false discoveries”.  Barras et al (2005) account for luck by focusing explicitly on the FDR amongst 
US funds and their results across all funds are broadly similar to ours – except that is for specific style categories, where 
Barras et al find evidence of positive performance in growth styles. Barras et al do not examine the performance of 
significant funds for which we set the maximum FDR at a specific desired level.  
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The rest of this article is organized as follows.  In section 2 we discuss the methodology 
behind the FDR and other methods of controlling for false positives in a multiple testing 
framework.  In section 3 we outline our data set and in section 4 we evaluate the evidence on UK 
equity mutual fund ex-post performance and section 5 concludes.   
 
 
2. Methodology : The False Discovery Rate 
Most previous work either tests the performance of the average fund or uses the 
standard procedure of independently testing each fund’s performance and stating the number of 
funds with significant alphas (hence assuming the FDR is zero).  The null hypothesis is that fund-i 
has no abnormal performance with the alternative that the fund delivers either positive or negative 
performance: 
 
  0 : iH 0α =    : 0A iH α >  or  0iα <  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
The issues that arise in multiple testing of m-funds of which  are truly null and are 
truly alternative can be demonstrated using table 1 (Storey 2002).  We call a fund’s performance 
significant whose p-value for the test statistic (e.g. t-statistic on alpha) is less than or equal to 
some threshold 
0m 1m
γ  ( 0 1γ< ≤ ).  The number of false positives  (sometimes referred to as lucky 
funds) and the number of significant funds 
F
R are:  
 
[1a] ( )F γ  = 0#{ | }ip H trueγ≤         1,.... ...,i m=  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 5
 [1b] ( )R γ  = #{ }ip γ≤  
 
We wish to estimate the false discovery rate FDR, which for large m is given by: 
 
[2] ( ) [ ( ) / ( )] [ ( )] / [( ( )]FDR E F R E F E Rγ γ γ γ γ= ≈  
 
An estimate of [ ( )]E R γ is the observed number of significant funds ( )R γ , but [ ( )]E F γ  
is unobservable.  However, 0[ ( )]E F mγ γ=  = 0 .mπ γ  where 0π = is the proportion of 
truly null funds.  The proportion of true null funds is also unobservable but to provide an estimate 
of 
0 /m m
0π  we can use the result that truly alternative features are clustered around zero, whereas 
truly null p-values are uniformly distributed.  The simplest method to estimate 0ˆ ( )π λ  is to choose 
a value λ  for  which the histogram of p-values becomes flat and to calculate 0π  using: 
[3] 0ˆ ( )π λ = #{ }(1 )ipm λλ>−    
 
If the histogram of p-values is perfectly flat to the right of our choice of λ then the 
estimate of 0π  is independent of λ .  So, if we were able to count only truly null p-values then [3] 
would give an unbiased estimate of 0π  - but if we erroneously include a few alternative p-values 
then [3] provides a conservative estimate of 0π  and hence of the FDR.  Of course if we set 
1λ = then 0ˆ ( )π λ = 1 which is far too conservative. 
 
For finite m, it can be shown that the bias in the estimate of 0ˆ ( )π λ  is decreasing in λ  
but its variance increases withλ .  An alternative method of estimating 0π  is to plot 0ˆ ( )π λ  
againstλ , fit a cubic spline to this data and take our estimate to be 0ˆ ( 1)π λ = - this is known as 
 6
 the smoothing method.  A third method of estimating 0π  is to exploit the bias-variance trade-off 
and choose λ  to minimize the mean-square error  20{ ( ) }E 0π λ π−  - this we refer to as the 
bootstrap method (which is outlined in the appendix).  Having estimated 0π  the estimate of the 
FDR is6 : 
 
[4] 0 0ˆ ˆ( ) . ( ) .( ) ( ) #{ }i
m mFDR
R p
π λ γ π λ γγ γ γ= = ≤  
 
The FDR can be applied to a two-sided test with equal-tailed critical values.  However, we 
can also partition the R  significant funds into R+  with significant positive alphas (i.e. best or 
winner funds) and R−  with significant negative alphas (i.e. worst or loser funds).  By definition 
false positives (lucky funds) ( )F γ  are drawn from the null distribution so we expect half of them 
to have positive and half of them negative alphas, hence we can estimate the FDR for the best 
and worst funds (Barras, Scaillet and Wermers 2005) :  
 
[5a] [0.5 ( )]( ) ( )
E FFDR
R
γγ γ+ +=  = 0ˆ0.5 . ( ).#{ }impπ λ γγ+= ≤   
[5b] [0.5 ( )]( ) ( )
E FFDR
R
γγ γ− +=   0ˆ0.5 . ( ).#{ }impπ λ γγ−= ≤   
 
where  and are the p-values of the best (ip+ ip− iα >0) and worst ( iα < 0) funds.  Barras et al 
(2005) use a Monte Carlo study on the CAPM model to show that the estimators outlined above 
are accurate, are not sensitive either to the method used to estimate λ  or to the chosen 
significance level - while Storey, Taylor and Siegmund (2004) show that estimators of the FDR 
                                                 
6
  This requires ( ) 0R γ > , hence the term “positive FDR” is also used.  We do not make this distinction since 
( ) 0R γ >  in our data.  
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 are robust to many forms of dependence in the estimated p-values (e.g. dependence in finite 
blocks).   
 
Controlling the FDR 
Low p-values indicate stronger evidence against the null and the p-value is the minimum 
possible false positive rate for which we reject H0 – but adopting a very low significance level can 
be too conservative.  To avoid a too conservative approach to inference, we may wish to isolate a 
set of funds such that among these funds the overall FDR is less than or equal to some desired 
threshold value. Intuitively this process can be described as follows. We wish to choose the 
minimum FDR amongst a group of funds for which we will reject H0 – this is known as the q-value.  
If we order the p-values in a ‘list’ from lowest to highest (1) (2) ( )... mp p p≤ ≤ ≤  then we can 
associate with each ordered  p-value, a statistic which gives the overall FDR for the set of 
funds with p-values less than .  Note that the have the same ordering as the .  For 
example, if we choose a desired FDR of 10%, then we find that position in our list corresponding 
to = 0.10 - for which there will also be an associated p-value, say 0.02.  We know that if 
we take all funds with  0.10 (all of which will have p-values less than or equal to 0.02) 
then the overall FDR among those funds will be no more than 10%.  Put another way, 
thresholding  at 10% may give 150 funds that are significant but we can now infer that a 
maximum of only 15 are expected to be false positives
( )( iq p )
)
)
iq p
)
                                                
( )ip ( )( iq p ( )ip
( )( iq p
( )( ) ≤
( )( iq p
7
.  The algorithm used to calculate the q-
values is described in an appendix. 
 
Calculation of the FDR depends on correct estimation of individual p-values.  Because of  
non-normality in regression residuals we use a bootstrap approach to calculate p-values of 
estimated t-statistics (Politis and Romano 1994).  Consider an estimated model of equilibrium 
 
7
  Note that = 0.10 does not imply that fund-i has a probability of 10% of being a false positive.  Because 
the threshold q-value includes funds which are more significant than fund-i, the probability that fund-i is a false positive 
( )( )iq p
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 returns of the form:  for i = 1,2,…,m funds, where  = number of 
observations on fund-i,  = excess return on fund-i, = vector of risk factors,  are the 
residuals and is the (Newey-West) t-statistic for alpha.  For our ‘basic bootstrap’ we use 
residual-only resampling, under the null of no outperformance (Efron and Tibshirani 1993).  First, 
estimate the chosen factor model for each fund and save the vectors 
,
ˆ
ˆ ˆ'i t i i t i tr Xα β= + + ,e iT
tir , tX ,ˆi te
ˆ
it
{ },ˆ ˆ,i i teβ .  Next, draw a 
random sample (with replacement) of length  from the residuals  and use these re-sampled 
bootstrap residuals  to generate a simulated excess return series  under the null 
hypothesis (
iT ,ˆi te
tie ,
~
tir ,
~
iα  = 0). Then, using  the performance model is estimated and the resulting t-
statistic for alpha, is obtained.  This is repeated B =1,000 times and for a two-sided, equal-
tailed test the bootstrap p-value for fund-i is: 
tir ,
~
b
it
  
[6]  1 1
1 1
ˆ ˆ2.min[ ( ), ( )]
B B
b b
i i i
b b
p B I t t B I t t− −= == >∑ ∑ i i<
                                                                                                                                                 
 
where is a (1,0) indicator variable. (.)I
 
 
3. Performance Models and Data  
Our alternative performance models are well known ‘factor models’ and therefore we only 
describe these briefly.  Each model can be represented in its unconditional, conditional-beta and 
conditional alpha-beta form.  Unconditional models have factor loadings that are time invariant.  
Carhart’s (1997) four-factor (4F) model is: 
 
may be much higher than 10%.  As noted in the text the q-value is the expected proportion of false positives among funds 
which are “more significant” than fund-i.  
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 [7] 
, 1 , 2 3 4i t i i m t i t i t i t i tr r SMB HML MOM ,α β β β β= + + + + + ε  
 
where  is the excess return on fund-i (over the risk-free rate),  is the excess return on the 
market portfolio while ,  and 
,i tr ,m tr
tSMB tHML tMOM  are factor mimicking portfolios for size, book-
to-market value and momentum effects, respectively.  The Fama and French (1993) 3F model 
includes only { ,  , } and has mainly been applied to UK funds (e.g. Blake and 
Timmermann 1998, Quigley and Sinquefield 2000, Tonks 2005) but for US funds Carhart (1997) 
finds that momentum is also statistically significant.  
tmr , tSMB tHML
 
In conditional alpha-beta models it is assumed that alpha and the factor betas may 
depend linearly on lagged public information variables  and for the CAPM this gives:    tZ
 
[8] ' '
, 1 0 0 , 1 , 1 , 1( ) ( ) ( * )i t i i t i b t i t b t i tr A z b r B z rα ε+ += + + + ++ +   
 
where  is the excess return on a benchmark portfolio (i.e. market portfolio in this case) and  
 is the vector of deviations of 
, 1b tr +
tz tZ  from its unconditional mean.  Conditional-beta models 
(Ferson and Schadt 1996) set ' 0iA = .  Following earlier studies (Ferson and Schadt 1996, 
Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman 1998) our Zt variables include permutations of: the one-
month T-Bill yield, the dividend yield of the market factor and the term spread.  
   
Our mutual fund data set comprises UK equity Unit Trusts and Open Ended Investment 
Companies (OEICs) and represent almost the entire set of UK equity funds which have existed at 
any point during the sample period under consideration, April 1975 – December 20028.  By 
                                                 
8
   Mutual fund monthly returns data have been obtained from Fenchurch Corporate Services using Standard & 
Poor's Analytical Software and Data. The data base has been extensively checked for multiple entries and style 
classifications. 
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 restricting funds to those investing in UK equity, more accurate benchmark factor portfolios may 
be used in estimating risk adjusted abnormal performance.  We have removed ‘second units’ and 
index/tracker funds leaving only actively managed funds.  The equity funds are categorized by the 
investment objectives of the funds which include: equity income (162 funds), ‘all companies’ (i.e. 
formerly general equity and equity growth, 553 funds) and smaller companies (127 funds).  The 
data set includes both surviving funds and non surviving funds.   
 
All fund returns are measured gross of taxes on dividends and capital gains and net of 
management fees.  Hence, we follow the usual convention in using net returns (bid-price to bid-
price, with gross income reinvested).  The market factor used is the FT All Share Index of total 
returns (i.e. including reinvested dividends).  Excess returns are calculated using the one-month 
UK T-bill rate.  The factor mimicking portfolio for the size effect, SMB, is the difference between 
the monthly returns on the Hoare Govett Small Companies (HGSC) Index and the returns on the 
FT 100 index9.  The value premium, HML, is the difference between the monthly returns of the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) UK value index and the returns on the MSCI UK 
growth index10.  The factor mimicking portfolio’s momentum behavior, MOM, has been 
constructed using the constituents of the London Share Price Database, (total return) index11.  
Other variables used in conditional and market timing models include the one-month UK T-bill 
rate, the dividend yield on the FT-All Share index and the slope of the term structure (i.e. the yield 
on the UK 20 year gilt minus the yield on the UK three-month T-bill). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
9
  The HGSC index measures the performance of the lowest 10% of stocks by market capitalization, of the main 
UK equity market.  Both indices are total return measures.   
 
10
  These indices are constructed by Morgan Stanley who rank all the stocks in their UK national index by their 
book-to-market ratio.  Starting with the highest book-to-market ratio stocks, these are attributed to the value index until 
50% of the market capitalization of the national index is reached.  The remaining stocks are attributed to the growth index.  
The MSCI national indices have a market coverage of at least 60% (more recently this has been increased to 85%).  Total 
return indices are used for the construction of the HML variable. 
 
11
  For each month, the equally weighted average returns of stocks with the highest and lowest 30% returns, over 
the previous eleven months are calculated.  The MOM variable is constructed by taking the difference between these two 
variables.  The universe of stocks is the London Share Price Data Base.  
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 4. Empirical Results 
We begin with a discussion of our preferred factor models.  Next we discuss alternative 
estimation methods for the proportion of truly null funds among our m-funds 0π , then we analyze 
the FDR for all our funds as well as the winner and loser funds taken separately – this allows us 
to ascertain whether such funds are concentrated in the tails of the performance distribution.  
Next we discuss the FDR for our three investment styles.  Finally, we examine the number of 
winner and loser funds in a set of funds for which we control the overall FDR to a chosen 
“acceptable” level and we examine the sensitivity of the number of truly winner and loser funds 
across the four different factor models used in our analysis.  
 
Preferred Models 
In this section, alternative performance models are examined.  All tests are conducted at 
a 5% significance level unless stated otherwise and results presented relate to all UK equity 
mutual funds over the period April 1975 – December 2002 and are based on 675 funds with a 
minimum of  = 36 observations.  For each model, cross-sectional (across funds) average 
statistics are calculated.  A single ‘best model’ is chosen from each of the 3 model classes; (i) 
unconditional, (ii) conditional-beta and (iii) conditional alpha-beta, using the Schwartz Information 
Criterion (SIC) and these results are reported in table 2.   
min,iT
  
[Table 2 here] 
 
In the best three models (bottom half of table 2), the cross-sectional average alpha takes 
on a small and statistically insignificant negative value (consistent with Blake and Timmermann 
1998).  However, of key importance for this study (and for investors) is the relatively large cross-
sectional standard deviations of the alpha estimates which is around 0.26% p.m. (3.1% p.a.), for 
the unconditional and conditional-beta models and somewhat larger at 0.75% p.m. for the 
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 conditional alpha-beta model.  This implies that the extreme tails of the distribution of abnormal 
performance may contain a substantial number of funds.  This is important since investors are 
more interested in holding funds in the right tail of the performance distribution and avoiding those 
in the extreme left tail, than they are in the average fund’s performance. 
 
The excess market return, , and the factor betas are consistently found to be 
statistically significant across all three classes of model, whereas the 
tmr , SMB
HML  factor beta is often 
not statistically significant, even at a 10% significance level (as discussed further at the end of the 
next section).  We find that the momentum factor ( MOM ) is generally not statistically significant 
at the individual UK fund level (e.g. Blake and Timmermann 1998, Tonks 2005), in contrast to US 
studies (Carhart 1997). For the conditional-beta model (2nd column, table II) only the dividend 
yield variable produces near statistically significant results.  In the conditional alpha-beta model 
we find that none of the conditional alphas has a t-statistic greater than 1.1 but some of the 
conditional betas are bordering on statistical significance and our best model is shown in column 
3. 
 
The above results suggest that the unconditional Fama-French 3 factor model explains 
UK equity mutual fund returns data reasonably well.  These findings are consistent with existing 
UK studies (Quigley and Sinqefield 2000, Fletcher 1995).  Turning now to diagnostics (bottom 
half of table II), the adjusted R2 across all three models is around 0.8, while the average 
skewness and kurtosis of the residuals is around 0.2 and 6 respectively and more than 60% of 
funds have non-normal errors (Bera-Jarque statistic – not reported here).  The Schwartz 
Information Criterion (SIC) is lowest for the unconditional 3F model.  The Fama-French 3 factor 
model was selected as the ‘best model’ for all three categories: unconditional, conditional beta 
and conditional alpha-beta model but because the 4F model is widely used for US equity mutual 
funds, we also report some variants using this model12.   
                                                 
12
  The market timing models of Treynor-Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson–Merton (1981) are not as good as the 3F 
and 4F models according to the Schwartz Information Criterion and are not reported here. 
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Estimating 0π  and the FDR 
The histogram of p-values is given in figure 1 for the unconditional 3F-model.  Exploiting 
the fact that truly null p-values are uniformly distributed [0,1] the height of the flat portion of the 
histogram gives a conservative estimate of 0π .  We cannot know that all p-values to the right of 
any chosen λ  (the x-axis of figure 1) are truly null but inclusion of a few alternative p-values 
makes our estimate conservative.   For finite m, the bias in our estimate 0ˆ ( )π λ  is decreasing in λ  but its variance increases with λ  and hence from figure 1 a reasonable estimate would be λ  
= 0.5 giving 0ˆ ( )π λ = 0.72.  Alternative estimates given by the smoothing and the bootstrap 
techniques for the four different factor models are given in table 3.   
 
[Figure 1 here] 
[Table 3 here] 
 
 Looking down the four columns in table 3 we see that for any given factor model the 
estimate 0ˆ ( )π λ  is reasonably constant across the three different estimation methods.  For three 
of the four factor models, the 3 alternative estimation methods give reasonably similar estimates 
of 0ˆ ( )π λ  of around 75-85% but for the Carhart 4F model 0ˆ ( )π λ  is somewhat lower and in the 
range of 62-64%.  However, the FDR also depends on the number of significant funds which will 
vary across each factor model, so the different estimates of 0ˆ ( )π λ  need not translate into 
different estimates of the FDR – as we see below.  The results indicate a large proportion of true 
null funds in our sample (that is funds with iα  = 0) - overall, around 75% of active funds yield truly 
zero alphas13.  
  
 14
 But what proportion of “significant funds” (for any chosen significance level) have truly 
differential performance? For reasons of brevity and clarity we first report detailed results for the 
unconditional 3F model (which is the best ‘in sample’ model) using the bootstrap estimate 0ˆ ( )π λ  
= 0.72 and report results for other models in an appendix.  Table 4 gives estimates of the FDR, 
the number of significant funds R, the number of funds from among the R-funds that are false 
discoveries, F and the number that are estimated to be truly significant T, at each significance 
level γ  (ranging from 0.01 to 0.20).  Panel A gives result for all funds while Panels B and C report 
results for the best and worst funds, respectively.    
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The standard approach indicates a relatively large number of significant funds for 
example, for γ  = 0.10 this amounts to 188 funds (27.8% of all funds).  However, the FDR is quite 
high at 25.8% so 48 of these significant funds (7.18% of all funds) are false discoveries leaving 
140 funds (20.67% of all funds) as having truly differential performance.  There is a clear 
difference of interpretation between the standard approach and one that takes account of false 
discoveries.  Indeed as the significance level is increased above 10% there is a danger in picking 
up a substantial number of additional significant funds, most of which are false discoveries.  For 
example, as we move from γ  = 0.10 to γ  = 0.15 then the increase in significant funds is 39 but 
only about one-third of these (14), have truly differential performance. 
 
With γ  = 0.01 the FDR is 6.8% and there are R = 71 (out of 675 funds) that are 
significant (panel A) with only F = 5 being false discoveries and T = 66 having truly differential 
performance.  As γ  increases the FDR increases.  However, a significance level of γ  = 0.025 
gives an estimated FDR = 11.8% while γ  = 0.05 gives a “reasonably acceptable” FDR = 17.7% 
                                                                                                                                                 
0ˆ ( )π13  Barras et al (2005) using data on US funds (and the unconditional 4F model) estimate λ  to be around 
78% when eyeballing the histogram of p-values. 
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 corresponding to a number of funds with differential performance of 91 and 113 respectively.  
Above this significance level the number of funds that are false discoveries rises at a faster rate 
than the number of significant funds so the FDR rises to quiet high (and probably unacceptable) 
levels.   
 
Best and Worst Funds 
The most striking feature about the performance of the best and worst funds revealed by 
our analysis of the unconditional 3F model is the relatively high FDR+  for the best funds and low 
 for the worst funds – this is true for any significance level chosen (Table 4, Panels B and 
C).  For example for 
FDR−
γ  = 0.05, of the R =137 significant funds only R+  = 21 have significant 
positive alphas while R−  = 116 have significant negative alphas.  But given that = 58% is 
much higher than = 10%, only 9 (1.3% of all 675 funds) have truly positive alphas (Panel 
B).  So, the standard approach indicates 
FDR+
FDR−
R+ = 21 funds have significant positive alphas but this 
“simple count” does not incorporate false discoveries, which implies only 9 funds truly outperform.  
Although very few best funds truly outperform their 3F benchmarks this number does not rise with γ  indicating that around T+ = 10 best funds (about 1.5% of all funds) are concentrated in the 
extreme right tail of the performance distribution.  The increase in the number of significant best 
funds R+  as γ  increases, is therefore due to the large number of false discoveries - as indicated 
by the rapid increase in  (Table 4, Panel B).   FDR+
 
The standard approach gives a relatively more accurate picture of the performance of the 
worst funds.  For example, for γ =0.05, the FDR−  is relatively small at 10.4% so of the R−  = 
116 significant worst funds, about 104 (15.4% of all funds) have truly negative alphas (Panel C).  
In contrast  to the location of the best funds, the number of truly worst performing funds T −  (and 
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 / )T m−  increases with γ , indicating that the poorly performing funds are fairly evenly spread 
throughout the left tail of the performance distribution in the interval [0,0.15]γ =  (Panel C)14.  
 
Style Categories 
It is useful for investors to know if different style categories give different results for the 
performance of the best and worst funds after taking account of the FDR15.  It turns out that 
although there are some minor differences, the broad qualitative results found when analyzing all 
mutual funds apply to the separate style categories.  For each of the three styles we find a high 
 for the best funds, a low FDR+ FDR−  for the worse funds and a relatively high overall FDR (for 
all significance levels).  Therefore we only report results for the three style categories using γ  = 
0.05 (full results are available on request). 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
For the “all companies” sector with 423 funds in total16, the overall FDR (for γ  = 0.05) is 
relatively low at 16.7% which with R = 91 funds found to be significant, gives 75 funds which truly 
have differential performance.  However, for the positive-alpha funds FDR+ = 76% so only 2-3 of 
the best all companies funds are truly significant but with FDR− = 9.4% most (i.e. 73) of the worst 
“all companies” funds truly underperform their benchmarks.  This pattern is broadly repeated for 
the 109 smaller company funds with FDR+ = 65% and FDR−  = 7% which implies that out of R = 
32 significant funds (for γ  = 0.05) only one fund has a truly positive alpha while 27 have truly 
                                                 
14
   These results for the unconditional 3F model are robust across our 4 different factor models and these results 
are reported in the appendix.  We also estimate FDR, FDR+ and FDR- recursively from 1990 and found no discernable 
trends in our estimates, indicating that the FDR has been reasonably constant.  Also our results for UK funds are broadly 
similar to those for ‘all’ US equity funds (1975-2002).  Barras et al (2005) find a FDR of 55% among the 52 ‘top’ funds (at a 
5% significance level), so only 23 of these (which constitutes 2% of all funds) have genuine skill and they all lie in the 
extreme right tail of the alpha-distribution. They find around 20% of all funds have genuinely ‘bad skill’ and these funds are 
spread throughout much of the left tail (and across all investment styles). 
 
15
  In order to calculate the FDR we used π0 estimate based on all funds as m needs to be ‘large’.  The results 
however do not change much if π0 is estimated using only funds who belong to the specific style category.   
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 negative alphas.  For equity income funds the situation is a little different because = 32% 
is not too dissimilar to =42%, so the number of truly positive and negative funds which 
outperform are approximately equal. Unfortunately there are few significant equity income funds 
so the number of genuine outperformers (and underperformers) is around 4
FDR+
FDR−
17
.   
 
Overall, the results show that only a handful of best funds from any of the different styles 
have truly positive alphas, while there are a relatively large number of the worst funds in the all 
companies (73) and smaller company (27) sectors with truly negative alphas.  But the 
performance of the worst equity income funds is mainly due to bad luck as only 3 funds have truly 
poor performance.  For investors, use of the FDR demonstrates that it is much more difficult to 
find winners than would be indicated by the standard approach.  
 
Controlling the Overall FDR 
Instead of simply estimating the false discovery rate among our funds, we can instead 
choose a “threshold” FDR and find a sub-set of funds which have an overall FDR which is less 
than this chosen threshold “q-value”.  The q-value threshold sets an upper bound on the 
proportion of funds with “significant” alphas, that turn out to be false leads.  We test the 
robustness of this approach across our 4 factor models.   
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
 Panels A-D of table 6 show the number of best and worse funds which lie below a 
chosen threshold q-value (together with the associated maximum p-value), for each of our four 
factor models.  For example, for the unconditional 3F-model and a threshold q-value of 0.10, we 
find 91 funds that are significant with 14 having positive alphas and 77 negative alphas – all of the 
aforementioned funds have a p-values of 0.02 or smaller.  Therefore to control the overall FDR to 
                                                                                                                                                 
16
  To obtain a p-value for each fund, we only included funds with a minimum number of observations of 36.  That 
means we used 423 all companies funds, 143 income funds and 109 smaller companied funds.   
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 a maximum of 10% we would choose a cut-off p-value for funds which we call “significant”, of 
0.02 - much lower than the conventional p-value cut-offs of 0.05 or 0.10 used to test each fund 
taken in isolation.  This is because when testing many funds for differential performance we 
require a lower p-value cut-off value in order to control the overall FDR at our chosen level.   
 
 As might be expected, for the different factor models there is some statistical variability in  
the number of (best and worst) funds that are “significant” after controlling for the overall FDR, but 
this variability is not particularly large.  For example, for all 675 funds, when controlling the FDR 
at 5% (10%) the number of best funds which can be taken to be significant across the four 
models lie between 4 and 9 ( 9 and 20) and the number of worst funds range between 31 and 43 
(40 and 85).  Thus if you are willing to accept a maximum FDR of 10% among funds you call 
significant, then there are a maximum of 20 truly winner funds (3% of all funds) and about 4 times 
more loser funds (13% of all funds) and this result is fairly robust across our 4 different factor 
models.  
 
Portfolios of Best and Worst Performers  
It is natural for an investor to be interested in the expected value of the alpha of a 
portfolio of funds among which the maximum FDR is chosen at some desirable pre-set level, say 
q = 10%.  There is no guarantee that such a portfolio will have a high (absolute) alpha since a 
fund could have a low q-value because the standard error of alpha is small relative to alpha itself.   
For a conservative estimate of this portfolio alpha we form equally weighted portfolios of either 
the best or worst funds, from the set of funds for which the q-value is less than 10%.  We report 
the expected value of alpha qEα ˆ0.9 qα= , where ˆqα  is the estimated value of the best or worst 
portfolio alpha for each of our 4 models18.  (This portfolio contains a changing number of funds 
over time for each of the different models).   
                                                                                                                                                 
17
  The results for small companies and income funds must be interpreted with caution and can be no more than 
indicative, since we need m large to ensure that the distribution of null p-values approaches a uniform distribution. 
18
  The expected value is  0(1 ( )) ( )q AE FDR q FDR qα α α= − +  where Aα and 0α are the values under the null 
and alternative hypotheses, but under the null 0α = 0 and under the alternative we use the sample estimate. 
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[Table 7 here] 
 
Table 7 shows that across the 4 models, the expected alpha for the best funds varies 
between 4.57% p.a. (bootstrap t = 5.4) for the Carhart 4F model to 10.1% p.a. (bootstrap t = 4.12) 
for the 3F-conditional beta model.  For the worst funds the expected alphas are much less 
variable across the 4 models with all alphas being close to -3.6% p.a. (with t-stats greater than 
7)19.  Part of the reason for the greater variability in alpha (and lower t-statistics) for the “best 
portfolio” is that the latter contains an average of only about 5-10 funds (across different models), 
whereas the “worst portfolio” has an average of around 35-50.  However, overall it appears that 
choosing a best or worse portfolio with a maximum FDR of 10% gives expected alphas which are 
economically significant.   
 
It is not possible to unambiguously compare the above method with the “standard 
method” since both require an arbitrary chosen “cut-off” point for fund selection.  Nevertheless as 
a reasonable point of comparison consider the standard method of including (best or worst) funds 
in your portfolio if they have p-values less than the “conventional” γ  = 5%.  The expected alpha 
is ( )Eα γ = {[1 ( )] AFDR γ α− 20 where Aα  is the population alpha under the alternative 
hypothesis and ( )FDR γ is either ( )FDR γ+  or ( )FDR γ−  as appropriate.  As an estimate of  
Aα  we use an equally weighted portfolio of either the best or worst funds (which are individually 
significant at γ  = 5%).  The best and worst portfolio alphas do not vary greatly across different 
models – ( )Eα γ for the best funds is between 2.5-3% p.a. (t > 5.4) and for the worst funds is 
between -2.8% p.a. to -3.5% p.a. (t > 5.8).   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
19
  These t-statistics must be interpreted as descriptive statistics since the funds in the best and worst portfolios 
have been included on the basis of their ordered t-statistics (p-values) – hence standard critical values do not apply.   
20
  The complete expression is ( )Eα γ =  0( ) [1 ( )] AFDR FDRγ α γ α+ − 0 but α =0 under the null 
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 Two practical results follow from the above.  First, when forming portfolios using the 
standard approach the estimated alpha of a portfolio of “significant” funds must be scaled down 
by the FDR to give an accurate estimate of the expected alpha from such a portfolio.  Second, it 
may be preferable to form portfolios which incorporate a tolerable threshold for the overall FDR 
among funds included in the portfolio – this may yield a higher expected alpha than the standard 
approach.  Although no methodology can isolate individual funds that are truly significant, both of 
the above approaches seem preferable to the usual method of only considering “significant 
funds”, without any allowance for false discoveries.   
 
 
5. Conclusions      
We use a multiple hypothesis testing framework to estimate the false discovery rate 
(FDR) amongst UK equity mutual funds.  At 5% and 10% significance levels, using all funds (and 
the unconditional 3F model) the standard approach gives the number of significant best funds as 
21 or 36, respectively.  But in comparison, we find a relatively high FDR for the best funds of 58% 
and 67% (at 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively), which indicates that less than half of 
these significant funds (i.e. around 9-12 funds or 1.8-3.6% of all funds) truly outperformed their 
benchmarks. For the worst funds the FDR at a 5% (10%) significance level, is relatively small at 
10.4% (15.9%).  Hence the proportion of all funds that truly underperform their benchmarks is 
15.4% (18.9%) of all funds - which does not differ greatly from the standard approach (which 
gives 17.2% (22.5%) as underperforming).  When we examine different investment styles this 
general pattern of very few genuine winner funds is repeated for all companies, small company 
and equity income funds.  There are a substantial proportion of worst funds in the all companies 
and small company sectors that truly underperform their benchmarks but there is little genuine 
underperformance for equity income funds.  In addition, the best funds tend to be concentrated in 
the extreme right tail of the performance distribution while the worst funds are dispersed 
throughout the left tail.  But the majority (around 75-85%) of UK mutual funds neither 
underperform nor outperform their benchmarks.   
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When we control the FDR at say 10% then around 10-20 best funds are found to have  
truly significant positive alphas while a much larger number of between 40 and 85 of the worst 
funds are found to truly underperform their benchmarks. Setting a maximum threshold for the 
FDR at say 10% a portfolio of best funds has an alpha in the range 5-10% p.a. (across different 
factor models) and the worst funds have an alpha of around -3.5% p.a.  Our results are robust 
across different factor models, therefore the FDR can be a useful method of assessing the overall 
performance of the UK mutual fund industry as, unlike the standard approach, it explicitly corrects 
for the number of false leads in the set of funds which are found to be statistically significant.  
 
 
Appendix 
1. Calculating q-values 
The “list” of m-ordered p-values from lowest to highest are  (1) (2) ( )... mp p p≤ ≤ ≤ . 
First calculate 0 ( )( )m mq p pπ=  
Then for  calculate:  1, 2,...,1i m m= − −
 {
( )
0 ( )0
( ) ( 1)
.
.( ) min min , ( )
#{ }
i
i
i i
p j
m pmq p q p
p iγ
ππ γγ +≤ ⎛ ⎞= = ⎜ ⎟≤ ⎝ ⎠  
So and therefore the q-values have the same ordering as the p-values and for 
each p-value there is an associated q-value. Now one can choose a q-value threshold (say 0.10) 
such that all funds in the “list” with smaller q-values, have an expected proportion of false 
positives of 10%.  We can now state this result in terms of estimating a p-value cutoff for a given 
false discovery rate. The q-value threshold has an associated p-value, say 0.02.  Hence, if funds 
with p-values less than 0.02 are said to be significant then among this set of funds the expected 
proportion of false positives is 10%.  
( ) ( 1)( ) (i iq p q p +≤ )
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 2. Bootstrap Estimate of 0ˆ ( )π λ  
We use a bootstrap procedure and choose λ  to minimize the mean-square error (MSE) 
.  First we compute 20 0[{ ( ) } ]E π λ π− 0ˆ ( )π λ for a range of values of λ = {0.05, 0.10, …, 0.95}   
0ˆ ( )π λ = #{ }(1 )ipm λλ>−    
Then we form B = 1,000 bootstrap estimates 0ˆ ( )bπ λ for b = 1, 2, …, 1000 and compute the MSE 
for each λ : 
{1 20 0
1
ˆ ˆ( ) [ ( ) min ( )]
B
b
b
MSE B λλ π λ π λ− == −∑   
and we choose *λ  such that *λ = arg min ( )MSEλ λ and then the bootstrap estimate of 0π  is 
given by *0ˆ ( )π λ  (see Storey 2002 and Storey, Taylor and Siegmund 2004).  
 
3. FDR for Different Factor Models 
 
[Table A1 – here] 
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Figure 1 : Histogram of p-values (FF 3Factor model) 
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 Table 1 : Testing m-Funds for Significance 
 
 Called significant 
(Reject H0) 
Called not 
significant 
(Do not reject H0) 
Number of funds 
Null is true F m0 – F m0 
Alternative true T m1 – T m1 
Total R m - R m 
 
Table 2 : Summary Statistics of the UK Equity Mutual Funds 
 
 FF 3 Factor Carhart 4F Conditional Beta 3F Conditional Alpha-
Beta 3F 
 Coeff. 
 
t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
Alpha -0.0570 -0.58 -0.0548 -0.51 -0.0319 -0.43 -0.1090 -0.42 
(Rm-rf)t 0.9123 25.19 0.9168 25.85 0.8639 21.18 0.8494 21.02 
SMBt 0.2886 4.58 0.2834 4.65 0.2854 4.51 0.2579 3.63 
HMLt -0.0246 -0.009 -0.0209 -0.14 -0.0236 -0.09 0.0169 0.38 
Momt -  0.0087 -0.09 -  -  
zt-1 (Rm-rf)t -  -  -0.0483 -0.90 -0.0560 -0.82 
zt-1 SMBt -  -  -  -0.0025 0.40 
zt-1 HMLt -  -  -  0.0332 0.37 
zt-1 -  -  -  -0.0733  
 
 
        
Adj. R-squared 0.8108  0.8227  0.8147  0.8209  
SIC 1.35  1.32  1.37  1.43  
Skewness 0.19  0.18  0.21  0.19  
Kurtosis 6.21  5.83  6.15  6.04  
 
 
        
# positive alpha 20  34  26  31  
# negative alpha 121  117  98  93  
 2
  
 
 
Table 3 : The Proportion of Null Funds 
Model FF 3 Factor Carhart 4F Conditional 
Beta 3F 
Conditional 
Alpha-Beta 3F 
From Histogram λ = 0.5 0.72 0.63 0.78 0.78 
Smoothing technique  0.84 0.62 0.89 0.82 
Bootstrapping 0.72 0.64 0.74 0.73 
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 Table 4 : FDR for Different Significant Levels (FF 3 factor), Pie Null = 0.7177 (Bootstrap) 
 
Panel A : All Funds (675 funds) 
 
Significance level FDR # of significant funds, R 
(R/M) 
# of false discoveries, 
F (F/M) 
# of truly differential 
performance funds, T 
(T/M) 
0.01 6.8% 71   (10.52%) 4.84   (0.72%) 66.16   (9.80%) 
0.025 11.8% 103   (15.26%) 12.11   (1.79%) 90.89   (13.47%) 
0.05 17.7% 137   (20.30%) 24.22   (3.59%) 112.78   (16.71%) 
0.10 25.8% 188   (27.85%) 48.44   (7.18%) 139.56   (20.67%) 
0.15 32.0% 227   (33.63%) 72.67   (10.77%) 154.33   (22.86%) 
0.20 37.6% 258   (38.22%) 96.89   (14.35%) 161.11   (23.87%) 
 
Panel B : Best Funds (236 funds) 
 
Significance level FDR # of significant funds, R 
(R/M) 
# of false discoveries, 
F (F/M) 
# of truly differential 
performance funds, T 
(T/M) 
0.01 22.0% 11   (1.63%) 2.42   (0.36%) 8.58   (1.27%) 
0.025 35.6% 17   (2.52%) 6.06   (0.90%) 10.94   (1.62%) 
0.05 57.7% 21   (3.11%) 12.11   (1.79%) 8.89   (1.32%) 
0.10 67.3% 36   (5.33%) 24.22   (3.59%) 11.78   (1.75%) 
0.15 77.3% 47   (6.96%) 36.33   (5.38%) 10.67   (1.58%) 
0.20 83.5% 58   (8.59%) 48.44   (7.18%) 9.56   (1.42%) 
 
Panel C : Worst Funds (439 funds) 
 
Significance level FDR # of significant funds, R 
(R/M) 
# of false discoveries, 
F (F/M) 
# of truly differential 
performance funds, T 
(T/M) 
0.01 4.0% 60   (8.89%) 2.42   (0.36%) 57.58   (8.53%) 
0.025 7.0% 86   (12.74%) 6.06   (0.90%) 79.94   (11.84%) 
0.05 10.4% 116   (17.19%) 12.11   (1.79%) 103.89   (15.4%) 
0.10 15.9% 152   (22.52%) 24.22   (3.59%) 127.78   (18.93%) 
0.15 20.2% 180   (26.67%) 36.33   (5.38%) 143.67   (21.28%) 
0.20 24.2% 200   (29.63%) 48.44   (7.18%) 151.56   (22.45%) 
Note : all percentages, in parentheses, are calculated out of the total number of funds in our data set, 675.   
 Table 5 : False Discoveries and Truly Significant Funds : Style Categories (γ = 0.05), Pie Null = 0.7177 
 
 
Panel A : All Companies (423 Funds) 
 
 False Discovery 
Rate, FDR 
# of significant funds, 
R 
# of false 
discoveries, F 
# of truly significant 
funds, T 
All Funds  FDR = 16.7% R = 91 F = 15.18 T = 75.82 
Best Funds (127 funds)  FDR+ = 75.9% R+ = 10 F+ = 7.59 T+ = 2.41 
Worst Funds (296 funds) FDR- = 9.4% R- = 81 F- = 7.59 T- = 73.41 
 
Panel B : Income Funds (143 Funds) 
 
 False Discovery 
Rate, FDR(%) 
# of significant funds, 
R 
# of false 
discoveries, F 
# of truly significant 
funds, T 
All Funds  FDR = 36.6% R = 14 F = 5.13 T = 8.87 
Best Funds (76 funds) FDR+ = 32.1% R+ = 8 F+ = 2.57 T+ = 5.43 
Worst Funds (67 funds) FDR- = 42.8% R- = 6 F- = 2.57 T- = 3.43 
 
Panel C : Small Companies (109 Funds) 
 
 False Discovery 
Rate, FDR(%) 
# of significant funds, 
R 
# of false 
discoveries, F 
# of truly significant 
funds, T 
All Funds  FDR = 12.2% R = 32 F = 3.91 T = 28.09 
Best Funds (33 funds) FDR+ = 65.2% R+ = 3 F+ = 1.96 T+ = 1.04 
Worst Funds (76 funds) FDR- = 6.7% R- = 29 F- = 1.96 T- = 27.04 
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 Table 6 : Controlling the FDR 
 
 
Panel A : FF 3 Factor 
 
q-value p-value # of best funds # of worst funds # of total funds 
0.05 0.006 6 45 51 
0.10 0.020 14 77 91 
0.15 0.038 19 107 126 
0.20 0.058 21 121 142 
 
Panel B : Carhart 4F 
 
q-value p-value # of best funds # of worst funds # of total funds 
0.05 0.006 9 43 52 
0.10 0.024 20 85 105 
0.15 0.048 29 113 142 
0.20 0.076 37 134 171 
 
Panel C : Conditional Beta 3F 
 
q-value p-value # of best funds # of worst funds # of total funds 
0.05 0.004 4 39 43 
0.10 0.012 9 55 64 
0.15 0.026 16 73 89 
0.20 0.046 25 91 116 
 
Panel D : Conditional Alpha-Beta 3F 
 
q-value p-value # of best funds # of worst funds # of total funds 
0.05 0.004 10 31 41 
0.10 0.012 11 40 51 
0.15 0.022 21 53 74 
0.20 0.038 25 70 95 
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 Table 7: Portfolio alphas with maximum FDR at q = 10% 
 
Model Best funds 
Expected Alpha 
qEα  
t-alpha Worst funds 
Expected Alpha 
qEα  
t-alpha 
Unconditional-3F 0.49    (5.92% p.a.) 5.46 -0.29    (-3.56% p.a.) 7.27 
Unconditional-4F 0.39    (4.57% p.a.) 5.40 -0.30    (-3.60% p.a.) 7.04 
Conditional beta,3F 0.83    (10.10% p.a.) 4.12 -0.29    (-3.54% p.a.) 7.32 
Conditional alpha-beta 3F 0.71    (8.50% p.a.) 5.80 -0.29    (-3.5% p.a.) 6.80 
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 Table A1 : False Discoveries and Truly Significant Funds : Different Factor Models (γ = 0.05) 
 
 
Panel A : Carhart 4F (π0 = 0.6438) 
 
 False Discovery 
Rate, FDR(%) 
# of significant funds, 
R 
# of false 
discoveries, F 
# of truly significant 
funds, T 
All Funds  FDR = 15.2% 143 21.73 121.27 
Best Funds  FDR+ = 36.2% 30 10.86 19.14 
Worst Funds FDR- = 9.6% 113 10.86 102.14 
 
Panel B : Conditional Beta 3F (π0 = 0.7437) 
 
 False Discovery 
Rate, FDR(%) 
# of significant funds, 
R 
# of false 
discoveries, F 
# of truly significant 
funds, T 
All Funds  FDR = 20.6% 122 25.10 96.90 
Best Funds  FDR+ = 44.8% 28 12.55 15.45 
Worst Funds FDR- = 13.4% 94 12.55 81.45 
 
Panel C : Conditional Alpha-Beta 3F (π0 = 0.7259) 
 
 False Discovery 
Rate, FDR(%) 
# of significant funds, 
R 
# of false 
discoveries, F 
# of truly significant 
funds, T 
All Funds  FDR = 22.7% 108 24.50 83.50 
Best Funds  FDR+ = 42.2% 29 12.25 16.75 
Worst Funds FDR- = 15.5% 79 12.25 66.75 
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